CV

Research Areas

• Area of Specialty: Philosophy of Mind
• Areas of Competence: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Metaethics, Cognitive Science
• Areas of Interest: Metaphilosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, Normative Ethics, Epistemology

Education

• Ph.D., Brown University (1998-2003); dissertation: “Conscious Content”; advisor: Jaegwon Kim
• M.A., Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1996-1998)
• B.A., Tel Aviv University (1993-1996)

Employment

• Associate professor of philosophy, University of Arizona, 2010-present
  
• Assistant professor of philosophy, University of Arizona, 2003-2010
• SESQUI Fellow, University of Sydney, 2005-8 (concurrently with above)

Publications

Books                   

• The Sources of Intentionality. Forthcoming with Oxford University Press.
  
• Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Edited books and journal issues

• Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. (Co-edited with Terry Horgan.)
  
• Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Special Issue of The Monist, April 2008. (Co-edited with Terry Horgan.)
• Moral Phenomenology. Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2007.
• Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2006. (Co-edited with Kenneth Williford.)
• Consciousness and Self-Representation: A Symposium. Psyche, 2006.

Book chapters

• “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.” In T. Horgan and U. Kriegel (eds.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
  
• “Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.” In J. Liu and J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
• “Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.” In T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
• “Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits.” In A. Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010.
• “Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives.” In M. Moscovitch, E. Thompson, and P.D. Zelazo (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (pp. 35-66). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
• “Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice.” In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science (pp. 195-217).  Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2006.
• “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 143-170). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006. [Second version, accompanied by Croatian translation, forthcoming in Synthesis Philosophica.]
• (With Kenneth Williford.) “Introduction: Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 1-8). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006.

Journal articles – philosophy

• “The Veil of Abstracta.” Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues 21 (2011).
• “Précis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.” Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• “Personal-Level Representation.” Forthcoming in Protosociology: Consciousness and Subjectivity.
• “Intentionality and Normativity.” Philosophical Issues 20 (2010): 185-208.
• “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.” Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 357-381.
• “Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 585-618.
• “Composition as a Secondary Quality.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 359-383.
• (With Terry Horgan.) “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.” The Monist 91 (2008): 347-373.
• (With Angela Coventry.) “Locke on Consciousness.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (2008): 221-242. 
• “The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.” Philosophical Studies 141 (2008): 79-95. (Invited special issue on ontological commitment)
• “Real Narrow Content.” Mind and Language 23 (2008): 304-328.
•  (With Nicole Hassoun.) “Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 45-55.
• “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (2007): 307-340.
• (With Terry Horgan.) “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We May Know It so Well?” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 123-144.
• (With David Jehle.) “An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT Theory.” Philosophical Psychology 19 (2006): 462-476.
• “Naturalizing Subjective Character.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 23-56.
• “Tropes and Facts.” Metaphysica 6 (2005): 83-90.
• “The Status of Appearances Revisited.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2005): 287-304.
• “Consciousness and Self-consciousness.” The Monist 87 (2004): 185-209.
• “Moore’s Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief.” Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 99-121.
• “Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearances.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 5-20.
• “Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?” Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 271-307.
• “The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 177-191.
• “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 103-132.
• “Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.” Synthese 134 (2003): 477-504.
• “Phenomenal Content.” Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 175-198.
• “Ethical Internalism and Purely Internal Rationality.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2002): 49-59.
• “PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.” Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 55-64.
• “Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring.” Dialogue 41 (2002): 517-540.
• “Normativity and Rationality: Bernard Williams on Reasons for Action.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1999): 281- 292.

Journal articles – cognitive science

• “Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008): 1-19. (Invited special issue on moral phenomenology)
  
• “A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007): 897-912.
• “Gray Matter.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (2007): 96-116.
• “The Phenomenologically Manifest.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007): 115-136. (Invited special issue on Dennett's heterophenomenology)
  
• “The Reduction of Conscious Emotion.” Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 9 (2005): 121-151. (Invited special issue on emotion)
• “The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2004): 171-193.
• “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness.” Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2003): 171-198.
• “Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2003): 1-26.
• “Emotional Content.” Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2002): 213-230.

Book reviews and reference works

• “Moral Phenomenology.” In H. Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
• “My Kangaroo.” Times Literary Supplement (issue of 20 November 2009).
  
• “Intentionality.” In T. Bayne, A. Cleermans, and P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.
• “Mysterianism.” In T. Bayne, A. Cleermans, and P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009.
• “Review of D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 515-519.
• “Back to Back.” Times Literary Supplement (issue of 23 March 2007).
• “Self-Consciousness.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007).
• “Review of N. Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective.” Mind 116 (2007): 749-753.
• “Review of M. Rowlands, Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 488-490.
• “Introduction: Consciousness and Self-Representation.” Psyche (2006).
• “Consciousness, Theories of.” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 58-64. ["Teorías de la conciencia." Trans. C. Muñoz, Praxis Filosófica 29 (2009): 179-188.]
• “Review of J. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.” Mind 114 (2005): 417-421.

Grants and Awards

• Discovery Grant, Australian Research Council (2010-15)
• SESQUI Fellowship, University of Sydney (2005-8)
• Discovery Grant, Australian Research Council (2005-8)
• Bellagio Residency, Rockefeller Foundation (2007)

Service

• Associate Director, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona (2004-present)
• Editorial Boards: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science
• Journal Refereeing: Philosophical Review; Mind; Noûs; Philosophical Studies; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Philosophers' Imprint; Australasian Journal of Philosophy; The Monist; Canadian Journal of Philosophy; Synthese; Mind & Language; Philosophical Quarterly; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; Erkenntnis; Dialectica; Philosophia; Trends in Cognitive Science; Consciousness and Cognition; Journal of Consciousness Studies; Philosophical Psychology; Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences; Foundations of Science; Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly
• Other Refereeing: Oxford University Press; MIT Press; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Research Council of Canada; American Philosophical Association; Society for Philosophy and Psychology
• PhD Dissertation Committees:

o        (Chair.) Benjamin Kozuch, TBD

o        (Co-Chair.) Anne Steadman, TBD

o        Michael Bruno, TBD

o        Farid Masrour, “Concepts, Unity, and Intentionality in Perceptual Experience” (2008)

o        Stephen Biggs, “Mind and Modality” (2007)

• External examiner, PhD committee for Miri Albahari, University of Calgary (2004)
• Conference Organizer:

o        “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program” (with Terry Horgan). University of Arizona, 17-19 October 2008.

o        “Time and Consciousness” (with Huw Price and David Chalmers). University of Sydney, 21-22 July 2006.

o        “Towards a Science of Consciousness 7: Tucson 2006” (organizing committee). Tucson AZ, 4-10 July 2006.

o        “Moral Phenomenology” (with Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan). University of Arizona, 3-5 November 2005.

o        “Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.” University of Arizona, 18-20 March 2005.