

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality	9
1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances	
1.1.1. An Anchoring-Instance Model of Concept Formation	
1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality	
1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor	
1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription	
1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry	
1.2.3. Objections and Replies	
1.3. ‘Experiential Intentionality’	
1.3.1. Definition	
1.3.2. Existence	
1.3.3. Scope	
2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory	68
2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality?	
2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation	
2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience	
2.1.3. Experiential Tracking	
2.2. The HOT Argument	
2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience	
2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality	
2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking	
2.4. Objections and Replies	
2.4.1. ‘Intentionality,’ ‘Representation,’ ‘Tracking’	
2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for?	
3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory	129
3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference	
3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference	
3.2.1. The Argument	

3.2.2. Responses	
3.2.3. Brains in Vats	
3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence	
3.3.1. The Argument	
3.3.2. Responses	
3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification	
3.5. Objections to Adverbialism	
4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory	196
4.1. Potentialism	
4.2. Inferentialism	
4.3. Eliminativism	
4.4. Interpretivism	
4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality	
4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed	
4.4.3. Objections and Replies	
5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality	236
5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism	
5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism	
References	265